IRGC Forms Iraqi Cells for 7 Drone Attacks on Gulf States Hosting US Forces
Updated
Updated · Institute for the Study of War · Jun 19
IRGC Forms Iraqi Cells for 7 Drone Attacks on Gulf States Hosting US Forces
3 articles · Updated · Institute for the Study of War · Jun 19
Summary
Eight Iraqi sources told Reuters the IRGC created new militia cells in Iraq that report directly to it and carried out at least seven drone attacks on Gulf countries between April 20 and May 17.
Three or four cells of about 10 elite Shiite fighters each allegedly launched three attacks on Kuwait, two on the UAE and two on Saudi Arabia from southern Iraqi desert areas.
Kuwait's Ali al Salem Airbase and a military terminal at Kuwait airport were among the targets, while the UAE and Saudi Arabia reportedly intercepted all incoming drones.
The cells appear to mark a tactical shift from working through established Iraqi militias, using smaller direct-reporting units to preserve plausible deniability and shield allied groups from blame.
That structure also fits rising US pressure on Baghdad to disarm Iran-backed militias, as Washington has tied economic support and oil-revenue access to curbing militia power.
How will regional powers counter Iran's newly proven missile saturation tactics?
Has the US-Iran nuclear deal already failed by linking it to Hezbollah's security?
Can international law challenge Iran's new unilateral control over the Strait of Hormuz?
Iran’s Covert Drone Campaign: Seven Attacks on Gulf States and the Evolving Threat to Regional Security (April–May 2026)
Overview
Between April 20 and May 17, 2026, Gulf states experienced a sharp rise in regional tensions due to a series of covert drone attacks launched from Iraqi territory. These attacks were carried out by newly formed, hardline Shi'ite factions operating under the direct command of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Following the killing of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, his successor, Esmail Qaani, established small, purpose-built covert cells to execute missions independently of traditional militia leaders. This evolution in IRGC tactics allowed for more agile and deniable operations, complicating regional security and diplomatic responses.