Taiwan to Build 1,850 Anti-Ship Missiles by 2029 as China Invasion Threat Grows
Updated
Updated · Reuters · Jun 4
Taiwan to Build 1,850 Anti-Ship Missiles by 2029 as China Invasion Threat Grows
3 articles · Updated · Reuters · Jun 4
Summary
Taiwan is on track to field about 1,850 anti-ship missiles by early 2029, according to a Reuters calculation, as it shifts toward an asymmetric defense aimed at surviving a first Chinese strike.
The buildup hinges on 850 U.S.-supplied Harpoon missiles and more than 1,000 domestically made Hsiung Feng II and III missiles, creating a Taiwan Strait “kill zone” to hit invasion or blockade fleets.
Another 400 Harpoons from a $2.4 billion U.S. sale are due to start arriving this year and finish by March 2029, though one senior Taiwanese official said the timetable could slip to 2030.
Taiwan is also adding shorter-range missiles and drone swarms, and on July 1 will launch a Littoral Combat Command to integrate coastal radars, anti-ship missiles and drones into one force.
The strategy draws on lessons from Ukraine in the Black Sea and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, even as analysts warn some Taiwanese missiles remain vulnerable at fixed sites before they can disperse.
Is Taiwan's missile buildup a costly distraction from the drone swarm strategy needed to truly deter an invasion?
Is Taiwan building a naval mine 'kill zone' that could ultimately trap itself during a Chinese blockade?
Could China's real weapon be insurance markets, capable of blockading Taiwan's chip industry without firing a missile?
Building a Missile Wall: Taiwan’s Asymmetric Defense Strategy and the Race to Deter Chinese Invasion
Overview
Taiwan is rapidly strengthening its defense by activating the Littoral Combatant Command and evolving its asymmetric strategy. By leveraging its geography and investing in mobile, survivable assets, Taiwan aims to deter or counter a potential PLA invasion. Central to this approach is the strategic deployment of anti-ship missiles on mobile launchers, which are dispersed and concealed across the island. This makes it much harder for the PLA to detect and destroy these assets during an attack, inflicting substantial costs on any invading force and complicating Beijing’s military planning. These steps mark a significant shift in Taiwan’s immediate defense posture.